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Avedis Donabedian, who created the conceptual
framework for quality assessments of health services,
was interviewed shortly before his death in November
1999. He described the health care problems that
he had encountered during his battle with cancer that
lasted nearly three decades. Jan Gregoire Coombs
quotes Donabedian in his last interview on page 277
of her book as follows: I have tried to choose doctors
who worked together reasonably well but there are
areas where no one takes responsibility, where plan-
ning is weak, when I am left on my own (...) HMOs
today are good at measuring costs but pay little atten-
tion to measuring effects. The failure to look at out-
comes undercuts all the reasons that so many of us
were interested in the prepaid group practice... These
few words of Donabedian summarize the message in
the book The Rise and Fall of HMOs: an American
Health Care Revolution.
In order to convey this message, author Jan Gregoire
Coombs combines two medical historical studies.
Firstly, she carried out a case study of the history of
a famous prepaid group practice: the Greater Marsh-
field Community Health Plan. For this study she had
access to all files and archives of this Health Plan.
Secondly, she conducted a historical study on the
legislation and health politics surrounding Health
Maintenance Organizations (HMOs). The American
presidential policies of Nixon, Johnson, Clinton and
Bush are all covered. Coombs used secondary
sources in this study, for example, newspapers in
which Donabedian was interviewed. The second study
forms the background of the more detailed case study
on the Greater Marshfield Community Health Plan.
Both studies are integrated: each chapter tells us
about Marshfield as well as about Washington.
The author, a medical historian, explains why HMOs
(an early form of Managed Care) failed to improve the
delivery of health care or to control health care costs
in the U.S. This is done through the lens of a real-life
case study of the Greater Marshfield Health Plan in
rural Wisconsin. This authoritative volume could be a
valuable asset to those working in health policy, health
care management, and health services research. Both
American and non-American readers will appreciate its
encyclopaedic scope and rich historical perspective,
as well as the important lessons that can be learned.
The book emcompasses four periods: 1920–1970
(introduction and Chapter 1), the period after the HMO
Legislation in 1973 until the beginning of the 1980s
(Chapters 2–7), the eighties (Chapters 8–10) and the
nineties through 2005 (Chapters 11–14). Coombs
describes how, in the first period, idealistic and pater-
nalistic doctors and insurers in the rural area of Marsh-
field merged a clinic and the necessary health
insurance for it. They created a health plan which
worked for the whole population; the doctors were
on the pay roll as well as being co-owners of the
plan. However, only the top management levels of the
insurance company (Blue Cross) and the clinic co-
operated: there was a strong personal relationship
between the CEOs of both authorities. On lower
organizational levels under the CEOs, both parties had
numerous small conflicts about finance, registration
and book-keeping.
During the second period the HMOs began to grow.
The word HMO was invented by the Nixon Adminis-
tration in 1972. This government saw the HMOs as the
remedy for beating the explosion of health care costs
that was taking place. A National Health Insurance
scheme, as proposed by the Johnson Administration
was only feasible for the elderly in the form of Medi-
care. However, the HMOs were a good alternative for
employees of corporations. In Chapter 7, Coombs
assesses the quality of services in 1979, when the
HMOs were at their peak. She quotes a Federal Office
report on HMOs which summarized 19 major studies,
25 reports and 69 quality variables, all using Dona-
bedian’s structure, process and outcomes measure-
ments. Coombs says on p. 124: HMOs fared very well
compared to fee-for-service care: nineteen reports
ranked the general quality of HMO care as superior
and six others found that the delivery systems were
comparable. None found overall care offered by HMOs
to be inferior.
It was during the third period that the fall of the HMOs
began. Blue Cross left the Greater Marshfield Com-
munity Health Plan in the 1980s. A few years later, in
1994, it started a lawsuit against the Marshfield. The
plan had too big a market share for its rural area and
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The Marshfield Clinic won the lawsuit after a costly
and stressfull period with much mass media attention.
Coombs quotes Chief Judge Richard Posner of the
Court of Appeals in her book (p. 181): If an entire
county has only twelve physicians, one can hardly
expect or want them to set up in competition with each
other. (...) Only as party of a large and sophisticated
medical enterprise such as the Marshfield Clinic can
they practice modern medicine in rural Wisconsin.
Everywhere, insurers withdrew as owners of health
plans. Employers purchased most of the nation’s pri-
vate health insurances and their selection criteria sel-
dom gave priority to quality of care but to the costs
involved (p. 132). So, insurance companies followed
the priorities of the employers. In Wisconsin, the
Marshfield Clinic had problems with compromising
the quality of care because of price competition. In the
nineteen-eighties and nineties, the good old group
practices of the fifties eroded and disolved into man-
aged care organizations.
During the fourth period since 1990, many attempts
and proposals by the government and by the Institute
of Medicine were made on a national level to restore
the old values of prepaid group practices and universal
coverage. The Clinton Administration proposed sev-
eral reforms in the early nineties, which would have
extended health care services to all Americans, as
Coombs describes in Chapter 11. The failure of Clin-
ton’s proposals marked the fifth time in sixty years that
Congress refused to accept a presidential call for uni-
versal health care. Instead, congress made some
piecemeal initiatives to improve health for the low
income Americans.
The Greater Marshfield Community Health Plan sur-
vived. In September 2003, the system treatment faci-
lities reported 1.8 million patient encounters, 695
million dollar revenues and 30 million dollar net earn-
ings (p. 233). However, Coombs warns on page 237:
Marshfield and other nonprofits need government
funding far in excess of the benefits from tax exemp-
tion to provide effective community service. Increasing
commercialism in the health care industry clearly
robbed most nonprofits of their important roles in pro-
tecting community health. At the end of the book we
see the quotation of Avedis Donabedian with which I
started this review. Donabedian’s last words in his
interview are: Sooner or later we are going to have to
develop a national health care plan. The design and
implementation of such a plan will be an exciting task
of the fairly near future, I believe. On the last page of
her book (p. 291) Jan Gregoire Coombs speaks com-
parable words.
This book: The Rise and Fall of HMOs provides the
European reader with a splendid insight of policy-
making in a case study on a famous HMO and of HMO
legislation in Washington. The studies are well docu-
mented and many suggestions are made for further
reading. I have two problems with the book. Firstly, I
myself would prefer separate reports of the case study
on the Marshfield Plan and the secondary study of
HMO legislation with a synthesis at the end. In this
way, it would be easier to follow exactly from which
study Coombs draws which conclusions. Secondly,
in the last chapters I miss an analytical approach
towards understanding thirty years of interaction
between employers, governments, doctors, insurance
companies and patients. Was each of these actors of
equal importance in all the three decades Coombs
describes? Nevertheless, the book gives a clear and
detailed description of the history of HMOs. I would
recommend all European health service researchers
who would like to learn about HMOs, managed care
and health care competition to read this book.
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